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451 
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the 
Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized 
During Unauthorized Nighttime Searches 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court first introduced the 
exclusionary rule.1 Under this rule, evidence obtained pursuant to an 
unreasonable search and seizure under Fourth Amendment standards 
cannot be used in subsequent criminal trials.2 Since that time, courts 
struggled to determine when application of the exclusionary rule was 
the correct remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. One such 
struggle concerned the “knock-and-announce” rule, which requires 
law enforcement officials to announce their identity and purpose 
before forcibly entering a private residence to execute a warrant.3 
Although the Supreme Court held that a violation of the knock-and-
announce rule was a factor in determining the reasonableness of a 
search,4 the Court did not clarify whether or not the exclusionary 
rule should apply to such violations. The result was that some courts 
suppressed evidence obtained in knock-and-announce violation 
cases,5 while other courts did not.6 
Finally, in 2006, the Court clarified the issue in Hudson v. 
Michigan.7 In Hudson, the Court held that because the purposes of 
the knock-and-announce rule did not include preventing the 
government from taking evidence described in a valid search warrant, 
 
 1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Shauhin A. Talesh, 
Note, Parol Officers and the Exclusionary Rule: Is There Any Deterrent Left?, 31 CONN. L. REV. 
1179, 1182 (1999) (“In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first applied the 
exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings.”). 
 2. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
 3. See United States v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 4. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 398 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831–32 (S.D. Tex. 2005); 
United States v. Sherman, 344 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233–34 (D. Me. 2004); State v. Ramos, 130 
P.3d 1166, 1172 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); State v. Anyan, 104 P.3d 511, 525 (Mont. 2004). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 336 F.3d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Commonwealth v. Wornum, 656 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. 1995); People v. Stevens, 597 
N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999). 
 7. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). 
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the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to violations of the knock-and-
announce requirement.8 Although the Hudson opinion clarified the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce 
violations, the applicability of the rule in other contexts remains 
unclear. One such situation involves nighttime searches. Since the 
colonial days of this country, the “nighttime search rule” has 
required that search warrants are to be executed during the daytime 
rather than at night.9 Thus, the question remains whether or not the 
Hudson decision affects the admissibility of evidence obtained during 
an unauthorized nighttime search.10 
This Comment argues that the rationale announced by the 
Supreme Court in Hudson should be extended to violations of 
nighttime searches.11 In other words, courts should hold that the 
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to violations of the nighttime search 
rule. This Comment reaches this conclusion by comparing the 
common law history, statutory codification, and—most 
importantly—the purposes behind the knock-and-announce rule and 
the nighttime search rule. 
Part II of this Comment explores the exclusionary rule, giving a 
brief history of the Fourth Amendment, discussing early American 
courts’ grounds for not excluding evidence obtained in illegal 
searches, and discussing the development of the exclusionary rule 
through Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III explores the knock-
and-announce rule. This Part gives a history of the knock-and-
announce rule in England and early America, discusses the 
development of the rule through Supreme Court cases, and discusses 
the background facts and the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson. 
Part IV discusses nighttime searches, including a discussion of the 
history of nighttime searches in early America and a brief discussion 
of case law regarding nighttime searches and the evidence seized in 
such searches. Part V then applies the holding of Hudson to 
nighttime searches to show that the exclusionary rule should not be 
 
 8. Id. at 2165. 
 9. See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897–98 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 10. Throughout this Comment, the term “unauthorized nighttime searches” refers to 
searches executed at night pursuant to a valid search warrant, although the search warrant 
authorized only a daytime search. 
 11. This Comment’s analysis is limited to extending the Hudson holding to the 
nighttime search context. An analysis of the “correctness” of the Hudson decision is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
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applied to unauthorized nighttime searches for the same reasons that 
the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be 
applied to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. This Part 
reaches this conclusion by comparing the origins, statutory bases, 
and purposes of the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime 
search rule. Finally, Part VI gives a brief conclusion. 
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The exclusionary rule provides that “evidence uncovered by 
police in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is excluded from a defendant’s 
criminal trial.”12 The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 
deter law enforcement officials from conducting searches and 
seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.13 This 
Part presents the history of the exclusionary rule. The first Section 
gives a brief history of the Fourth Amendment and the reasons that 
the Framers included it in the Bill of Rights. The second Section 
discusses the application of the Fourth Amendment in early America 
and shows the early courts’ hesitance to exclude evidence, even if it 
had been illegally obtained by law enforcement officers. The third 
Section then discusses the birth of the federal exclusionary rule in the 
twentieth century and the development of the rule through Supreme 
Court cases. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment assures citizens of “[t]he right . . . to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”14 Many legal scholars, as 
 
 12. Patrick Tinsley et al., In Defense of Evidence and Against the Exclusionary Rule: A 
Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV); see 
also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (“The exclusionary rule has 
traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct 
result of an unlawful invasion.”). The exclusionary rule was famously summarized in Justice 
Cardozo’s cynical statement that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.” People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 13. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (“The primary justification for the 
exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment 
rights.”); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that the 
exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect”). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in full:  
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well as many courts, attribute the genesis of the Fourth Amendment 
to two British practices that the colonists despised: the use of general 
warrants and the use of writs of assistance.15 
General warrants were used mainly in England and were 
historically used “to search and seize any printing press or papers 
critical of the King or Parliament.”16 General warrants “failed to 
specify who or what was to be searched or seized, allowing 
governmental officials to . . . search anything” that they wished to 
search without individualized suspicion.17 
Even more odious to the colonists were the writs of assistance, 
which were commonly used by British officials in the early American 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Id. 
 15. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s creation was a reaction 
to the abuses of the general warrant by England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies.”); 
see also O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir. 1989) (“It is axiomatic 
that the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the evils of the general 
warrants in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies.”); Devon J. Goodman, 
Casenote, Hoay v. State, A Look at the United States Supreme Court’s and Arkansas’s 
Misapplication of the Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception, 57 ARK. L. REV. 993, 996–
97 (2005) (“The United States Supreme Court recognized that the framers of the United 
States Constitution gave birth to the Fourth Amendment in memory of the British practice in 
the American colonies of issuing general warrants which allowed officers to search and seize 
with virtually no regulation and no requirement of reasonableness.” (citing Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886))). 
 16. Darren K. Sharp, Note, Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: What Happened 
to Individualized Suspicion?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 149, 152 (1997); see also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 
625–26 (“Prominent and principal among these [abuses] was the practice of issuing general 
warrants by the Secretary of State, for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of 
books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the charge of libel.”). 
 17. Sharp, supra note 16, at 152; see also Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment—
Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1230 (1996) (“General warrants authorized searches for 
persons or papers not named specifically in the warrant.”). The English parliament declared 
general warrants illegal in 1776. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473. It was during the Parliament 
floor debates that William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, made his famous statement:  
The poorist man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It 
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; 
the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not 
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 425 
n.1 (7th ed. 1903)). 
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colonies.18 Writs of assistance were a type of general warrant, but the 
writs were more abusive than the general warrants used in England.19 
The British implemented the use of writs of assistance in an effort to 
discover smuggled goods.20 The writs gave revenue officers complete 
discretion to search any home at any time for smuggled goods.21 
James Otis, an American revolutionary, declared the writs of 
assistance to be “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, 
that ever was found in an English law book” because they put “the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”22 Thus, it 
was in response to these abuses by the British Government that the 
Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment in order to protect the 
“sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”23 
B. Lack of Evidentiary Exclusion in Early America 
Although the Fourth Amendment grants protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures,24 the amendment “provides 
neither a remedy nor a mechanism for prevention if a violation 
occurs.”25 From the time of America’s independence until the early 
twentieth century, courts did not exclude evidence from criminal 
trials, even if it had been obtained by police during an illegal 
 
 18. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625; O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473; Josephson, supra note 17, at 
1231 (“The writs authorized customs officials and their subordinates to search anywhere they 
thought smuggled goods would be hidden and to break open containers suspected of holding 
smuggled goods.”). 
 22. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. at 630; see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (“[T]he 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment [was] to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested 
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at 
997 (“Resistance to [general warrants and writs of assistance] and the principle that a man’s 
house was his castle established the foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s principle that the 
home should not be invaded by any general authority to search and seize.”). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182; see also Patrick Alexander, Note, Pennsylvania Board 
of Probation & Parole v. Scott: Who Should Swallow the Bitter Pill of the Exclusionary Rule? The 
Supreme Court Passes the Cup, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 69, 69 (1999) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment “contains no explicit remedy for violations of a person’s right to be free from 
unreasonable searches”). 
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search.26 Courts were only concerned with whether or not the 
evidence was probative; if the evidence was probative to determine 
the guilt of the accused, the evidence was admissible, regardless of 
how it was obtained.27 If the evidence proved the defendant’s guilt, 
the government officials who illegally obtained the evidence had a 
“complete defense against charges that the search was a violation of 
the defendant’s rights.”28 Even the Supreme Court “continued to 
apply the common law rule that evidence is admissible however 
obtained” into the early twentieth century.29 Thus, in early American 
law, there was no remedy available for the defendant who had 
probative evidence offered against him that the government had 
confiscated during an illegal search.30 
C. The Birth and Development of the Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule was judicially created in 1914 in Weeks v. 
United States.31 In Weeks, the Supreme Court overruled prior 
 
 26. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 844 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 
15,551) (“The law deliberates not on the mode, by which [evidence] has come to the 
possession of the party, but on its value in establishing itself as satisfactory proof.”); 
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841), superseded by statute, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 2B (West 1964) as recognized in Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 
N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (“If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the 
warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the 
officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the 
papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue . . . . [T]he court can take no 
notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a 
collateral issue to determine that question.”); Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 64 (“At common 
law, and continuing for one hundred years after the passage of the Fourth Amendment, 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt was never excluded just because it was obtained illegally.”). 
 27. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 64 (“The common law excluded evidence that was 
tainted by unreliability or suspect probative value . . . but probative evidence, regardless of its 
source, was admissible, since it tended to establish the truth, and, thus, help achieve justice.”); 
Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (“[T]hrough the nineteenth century, the improper seizure of 
evidence did not affect its admissibility.”). 
 28. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 65; see also id. (“[T]he common law not only did 
not exclude illegally-obtained evidence, but it even allowed that evidence to retroactively justify 
what would otherwise be an illegal search and seizure.”). 
 29. Id. (citing Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)). 
 30. Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (“[F]or more than a century after the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress created any remedy that would 
prevent unreasonably seized evidence from being admitted at trial.”). 
 31. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Talesh, supra note 1, at 
1182 (“In Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to 
criminal proceedings.”). 
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common law jurisprudence and held that “the admission of 
improperly seized evidence implicate[d] the Fourth Amendment.”32 
Specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant “could, prior to 
trial, petition for the return of the property secured through an 
illegal search and seizure by federal officers.”33 The goal of 
protecting the integrity of the judiciary was the primary basis for the 
Court’s decision.34 The Court felt that “it would be implicitly 
condoning the use of illegally obtained evidence and 
unconstitutional behavior if it allowed the trial court to admit as 
evidence private documents . . . when no warrant had been 
obtained.”35 In support of its holding, the Court stated that 
violations of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights caused by 
unreasonable government searches “should find no sanction in the 
judgments of the courts.”36 Additionally, the Court reasoned that if 
there was no judicial remedy for unreasonable government searches, 
then the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment “might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution.”37 Thus, “the exclusionary 
rule began to take form as the ‘remedy’ that gave meaning to the 
Fourth Amendment.”38 
The Weeks decision, however, was limited because it only applied 
to federal courts.39 State courts were not bound to the exclusionary 
 
 32. Alexander, supra note 25, at 72 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398). 
 33. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398). 
 34. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92; Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182 (“The Court claimed 
that not applying the exclusionary rule to such proceedings would compromise the integrity of 
the judiciary.”). 
 35. Talesh, supra note 1, at 1182; see Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
 36. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392; see also id. at 393 (“The efforts of the courts and their 
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the 
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have 
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”). 
 37. Id. at 393 (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used 
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as 
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”). 
 38. Alexander, supra note 25, at 74. 
 39. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398; Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67 (“Originally, the 
exclusionary rule applied only in cases involving the federal government, because the Fourth 
Amendment restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures applied only to federal and not 
to state officers.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at 998 (“While the Supreme Court in Weeks 
required exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, it only extended the exclusionary rule 
to the federal government and its agencies, not to the states.”). 
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rule, as they were “free to adopt their own rules of evidence.”40 
Although most states had constitutional provisions similar to the 
Fourth Amendment, the majority of the states “rejected the 
exclusionary rule and continued to allow both civil and criminal 
courts to consider all probative evidence.”41 States continued to hold 
that the evidence was still “competent,” even if the police had 
trespassed without a warrant.42 Although evidence that had been 
illegally obtained by federal officers was not admissible in state 
courts,43 federal courts were allowed to admit evidence that had been 
illegally obtained, “so long as it was the result of a search by state 
police and not federal officials.”44 This practice became known as the 
“silver platter doctrine” because state officers could effect a 
warrantless search and present the seized evidence to federal officials, 
who could then use the evidence in the federal prosecution of the 
defendant.45 
In 1949, the Court took its first step in forcing the exclusionary 
rule on the states. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.46 However, Wolf did 
not specifically require the states to adopt the exclusionary rule as the 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.47 The Court allowed the 
states to “decide what practice would work best for them individually 
in guarding against unreasonable searches and seizures.”48 The states 
 
 40. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67. 
 41. Id. In 1926, the New York Court of Appeals noted that forty-five states had 
considered the exclusionary rule declared in Weeks, and thirty-one of the states had outright 
rejected it. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 42. See, e.g., Defore, 150 N.E. at 586–87 (rejecting the exclusionary rule and holding 
that a police officer who entered the defendant’s room at a boarding house without a warrant 
“might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression,” but the 
evidence was still admissible in trial). 
 43. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956). 
 44. Tinsley et al., supra note 12, at 67 (emphasis omitted). 
 45. Goodman, supra note 15, at 999. This “silver platter doctrine” came to an end with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960). 
 46. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 
643 (1961); see also Alexander, supra note 25, at 74 n.45 (“[I]t was not until 1949 that the 
Supreme Court expressly held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposed the Fourth Amendment limitations on the states.”); Goodman, supra note 15, at 998. 
 47. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31–33; Alexander, supra note 25, at 74–75. 
 48. Goodman, supra note 15, at 998–99 (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31–32); see also 
Talesh, supra note 1, at 1183 n.23 (“[T]he Wolf decision . . . invited states to generate and 
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could still reject the exclusionary rule and “instead utilize other 
effective remedies, such as the threat of civil suits or 
interdepartmental training and discipline, to deter Fourth 
Amendment violations.”49 
Twelve years later, however, the Court overruled Wolf in Mapp v. 
Ohio and specifically mandated that state courts apply the 
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.50 
The Court stated in its opinion that “all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same 
authority, inadmissible in a state court.”51 The Court required the 
adoption of the exclusionary rule because it felt that the alternatives 
were ineffective.52 Thus, the Court “close[d] the only courtroom 
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in 
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific 
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.”53 
III. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE 
The knock-and-announce rule requires law enforcement officials 
to “knock and announce their presence and authority prior to 
effecting a non-consensual entry into a dwelling.”54 This Part 
explores the history and development of the knock-and-announce 
rule. The first Section discusses the rule’s development in early 
British and American common law. The second Section then 
explores the rule’s development through Supreme Court cases, 
focusing specifically on the application of the exclusionary rule to 
violations of the knock-and-announce rule. The third Section 
discusses the recent Supreme Court case of Hudson v. Michigan, in 
which the Court overruled its own precedent and held that evidence 
 
develop their own procedures for addressing evidence which violated the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 49. Alexander, supra note 25, at 74–75 (citing Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31).  
 50. Mapp, 376 U.S. at 657; see also Alexander, supra note 25, at 75 (“In 1961 . . . the 
Court reversed its 1949 decision and held that the Constitution did require the states to adopt 
the exclusionary rule.”); Talesh, supra note 1, at 1183. 
 51. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
 52. See id. at 652 (stating that “other remedies have been worthless and futile”). 
 53. Id. at 654–55. 
 54. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 198 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States 
v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The knock and announce requirement . . . 
generally requires police officers entering a dwelling to knock on the door and announce their 
identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.”). 
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should not be excluded when law enforcement officers violate the 
knock-and-announce rule.55 
A. The Knock-and-Announce Rule in English and  
Early American History 
The knock-and-announce rule has common law roots that date 
back over four hundred years.56 The common law requirement that 
police officers knock and announce their presence before forcibly 
entering a private residence can be traced to the landmark Semayne’s 
Case of 1603.57 Semayne’s Case held that 
[i]n all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not 
open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do 
other execution of the K[ing]’s process, if otherwise he cannot 
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his 
coming, and to make request to open doors . . . for the law without 
a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any 
house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which 
great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when 
no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of 
which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey 
it . . . .58 
Although the writ at issue in Semayne’s Case was a civil writ, the 
reasoning of the case was adopted in the context of criminal cases in 
The Case of Richard Curtis.59 The knock-and-announce requirement 
of Semayne’s Case was widely adopted by the English legal scholars of 
the time,60 suggesting that the requirement “was a widespread 
practice at common law during the Eighteenth Century.”61 
 
 55. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163 (2006). 
 56. Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the 
Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1993). 
 57. Semayne’s Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); see also Garcia, supra note 56, at 
687–88 (attributing the genesis of the knock-and-announce rule to Semayne’s Case). 
 58. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195–96. 
 59. The Case of Richard Curtis, (1757) 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B.) (holding that 
officers serving an arrest warrant could “break open doors, after having demanded admittance 
and given due notice of their warrant”); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 1236 (noting that 
the Case of Richard Curtis is the “first reported application of the announcement requirement 
in a criminal case”). 
 60. See, e.g., 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116–17 
(Prof’l Books 1971) (1736) (“If a justice of the peace issue a warrant to apprehend a felon, 
who is in his own house, and after notice of the warrant and request to open the door it is 
GITTINS.PP2 4/5/2007 11:16:39 AM 
451] Excluding the Exclusionary Rule 
 461 
The knock-and-announce rule was adopted in early American 
case law.62 In fact, the rule “was embraced in the United States prior 
to the ratification of the Constitution.”63 Before the Constitution 
was ratified, ten states had already passed laws requiring law 
enforcement officers to announce their purpose prior to forcibly 
entering a house,64 and popular legal manuals noted that 
announcement was required prior to forcible entry.65 After the 
ratification of the Constitution and the Fourth Amendment, early 
American cases continued to require announcement before forcible 
entry was allowed.66 Congress codified the common law knock-and-
announce rule in 1917 when it passed the Espionage Act.67 The 
statute is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 and states that 
“[t]he officer may break . . . any part of a house, or anything therein, 
to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and 
purpose, he is refused admittance . . . .”68 
B. The Development of the Knock-and-Announce Rule in Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence: Applying the Exclusionary Rule 
The Supreme Court first examined the knock-and-announce rule 
in 1958 in the case of Miller v. United States.69 Miller involved a 
warrantless entrance into an apartment that resulted in the arrest of 
the defendant for violations of federal narcotics laws.70 The 
 
refused or neglected to be done, the officer may break open the door to take him . . . .”); 2 
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 86 (Garland Publ’g 1978) 
(1721) (“[N]o one can justify the breaking open another’s doors to make an arrest, unless he 
first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give him 
admittance.” (capitalization altered)). 
 61. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1236. 
 62. Garcia, supra note 56, at 689. 
 63. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1237. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1238; see also Randall S. Bethune, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and the 
Knock-and-Announce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for Otherwise Reasonable Search 
Warrant Execution, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 879, 881 (2001) (“The principle of knock-and-
announce was part of early American common law.”). 
 67. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, Tit. XI, § 8–9, 40 Stat. 217, 228–29 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3109 (2000)); Josephson, supra note 17, at 1239. 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 
 69. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 
1242. 
 70. Miller, 357 U.S. at 302–03. 
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defendant argued that the arrest—and the resulting search of his 
apartment—was unlawful because the police did not give notice of 
their authority and purpose before they forced their way into the 
apartment.71 The Court began its decision by noting that the knock-
and-announce rule is “deeply rooted in our heritage and should not 
be given grudging application.”72 The Court then applied the rule 
and held that the defendant “could not be lawfully arrested in his 
home by officers breaking in without first giving him notice of their 
authority and purpose.”73 Thus, because the police had invaded the 
apartment without giving notice, the Court concluded that “the 
arrest was unlawful, and the evidence seized should have been 
suppressed.”74 Although the Court applied the exclusionary rule in 
this case, it “did not apply a constitutional standard” for doing so.75 
The Court next visited the knock-and-announce rule in Ker v. 
California.76 Ker is the first Supreme Court case in which the Court 
specifically addressed the constitutional considerations of the knock-
and-announce rule.77 The Ker Court was split four-to-four on the 
issue of whether an unannounced police entry was reasonable under 
Fourth Amendment standards.78 In his plurality opinion, Justice 
Brennan stated that “[e]ven if probable cause exists for the arrest of a 
person within, the Fourth Amendment is violated by an 
unannounced police intrusion into a private home, with or without 
an arrest warrant . . . .”79 Thus, the constitutional implications of the 
 
 71. Id. at 305. 
 72. Id. at 313. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 313–14. 
 75. Bethune, supra note 66, at 881–82. 
 76. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
 77. Bethune, supra note 66, at 882; see also Garcia, supra note 56, at 693 (“The 
Supreme Court recognized the constitutional dimension of the ‘knock and announce’ rule in 
Ker v. California.”). 
 78. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1244. 
 79. Ker, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). This statement was subject to 
exceptions: 
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers’ authority and purpose, or 
(2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent 
peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within, made aware of the presence of 
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are 
then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the 
destruction of evidence is being attempted. 
Id. 
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knock-and-announce rule remained unclear. “[C]ommentators 
believed that the Court had constitutionalized the knock-and-
announce rule. However, courts split as to whether the knock-and-
announce rule was constitutionally mandated.”80 
Finally, in a unanimous decision in Wilson v. Arkansas,81 the 
Court squarely addressed the question of “whether an unannounced 
entry by police armed with a search warrant violates the Fourth 
Amendment.”82 The Court began its opinion by noting that in 
evaluating the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it looks “to 
the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
afforded by the common law at the time of the framing.”83 After 
reviewing the common law history of the knock-and-announce rule, 
the Court concluded that the “Framers of the Fourth Amendment 
thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was 
among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of 
a search or seizure.”84 Thus, the Court held that “in some 
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”85 However, the Court 
failed to address what these circumstances were, and instead “[left] 
to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under 
which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”86 Additionally, the Court did not consider the State’s 
argument that the Constitution does not require the exclusion of 
evidence seized following the unannounced entry of the officers 
effecting the search.87 The effect of this ruling was that state courts 
split on the question of what was the correct remedy for violations of 
the knock-and-announce rule.88 Was it suppression of the evidence 
or something else? This question was resolved in Hudson v. 
Michigan,89 discussed in the next Section. 
 
 80. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1246. 
 81. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
 82. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1229. 
 83. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931. 
 84. Id. at 934. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 936. 
 87. See id. at 937 n.4; see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 1251. 
 88. See supra notes 5–6. 
 89. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006). 
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C. Hudson v. Michigan: Detaching the Exclusionary Rule 
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court faced the issue of 
“whether violation of the ‘knock-and-announce’ rule requires the 
suppression of all evidence found in the search.”90 In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court held that application of the exclusionary rule to violations 
of the knock-and-announce rule was unjustified.91 This Section 
discusses the facts and procedural history of Hudson, followed by a 
discussion of the Court’s majority opinion. 
1. Facts and lower court holdings 
Police obtained a search warrant to search Booker Hudson’s 
home for both drugs and firearms.92 When the police executed the 
warrant, they announced their entrance, but only waited three to five 
seconds before forcibly entering the home.93 As a result of the 
search, the police found a large quantity of drugs in the home.94 
Additionally, cocaine rocks were found in Hudson’s pocket, and a 
loaded gun was found next to where Hudson was sitting.95 Based on 
the results of the search, Hudson was charged with unlawful drug 
possession and unlawful firearm possession under Michigan law.96 
Hudson moved the trial court to suppress all of the evidence 
found during the search based on the argument that the police had 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by not waiting long enough 
after their announcement before forcing entry into the home.97 The 
State conceded that the police’s entry violated the knock-and-
announce rule, but argued that suppression was not the correct 
remedy.98 The state trial court granted the suppression motion and 
dismissed the charges; however, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that “suppression is inappropriate” for a knock-
and-announce violation.99 The court based its holding on People v. 
 
 90. Id. at 2162. 
 91. Id. at 2168. 
 92. Id. at 2162. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 2163. 
 99. Id. at 2162. 
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Stevens, a 1999 Michigan Supreme Court case that held that a 
violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not require 
suppression of evidence because the evidence “would have been 
inevitably discovered.”100 The Michigan Supreme Court denied 
review of the case,101 but the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in 2005.102 
2. Supreme Court holding 
The Court began its opinion by noting that the knock-and-
announce requirement “is an ancient one.”103 Following a brief 
synopsis of its case law concerning the knock-and-announce rule and 
its relation to the Fourth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that 
the rule announced in Wilson “is not easily applied.”104 This was 
followed by a brief discussion of the exclusionary rule, which the 
Court noted “has always been our last resort, not our first 
impulse.”105 The Court also noted that the exclusionary rule 
“generates ‘substantial social costs.’”106 The Court asserted that the 
police’s illegal entry “was not a but-for cause of obtaining the 
evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the 
police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and 
would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house.”107 
A major portion of the opinion focused on purposes of—or, in 
the Court’s language, “the interests protected” by—the knock-and-
announce rule.108 The first interest noted by the Court is “the 
protection of human life and limb.”109 The rule protects this interest 
because “an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed 
self-defense by the surprised resident.”110 The second interest is the 
“protection of property.”111 The Court noted that the knock-and-
 
 100. People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999). 
 101. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162. 
 102. Hudson v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005) (mem.). 
 103. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2163. 
 106. Id. at (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
 107. Id. at 2164. 
 108. Id. at 2165.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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announce rule “gives individuals ‘the opportunity to comply with the 
law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible 
entry.’”112 The final interest protected by the knock-and-announce 
rule is the “privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden 
entrance.”113 The announcement requirement “gives residents the 
‘opportunity to prepare themselves for’ the entry of the police.”114 In 
other words, it gives the individual time to “pull on clothes or get 
out of bed.”115 
The Court then noted the interest that the knock-and-announce 
rule has never protected: “one’s interest in preventing the 
government from seeing or taking evidence described in a 
warrant.”116 The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule was 
“inapplicable” because “the interests that were violated in this case 
have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence.”117 The Court’s 
ultimate holding in the case was that “the social costs of applying the 
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations are considerable; 
the incentive to such violations is minimal”; therefore, “[r]esort to 
the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified.”118 
The issue of whether or not to exclude evidence obtained during 
a search in which police fail to follow the knock-and-announce rule is 
now settled law. The Hudson Court made it clear that the 
suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for violations 
of the knock-and-announce rule. Nevertheless, the appropriate 
remedy for other search violations, such as violations of the 
nighttime search rule, remains unresolved. 
IV. NIGHTTIME SEARCHES 
The general rule regarding the execution of search warrants is 
that they should be executed during the daytime rather than the 
nighttime.119 It is widely recognized that nighttime searches inflict a 
 
 112. Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5). 
 115. Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2168. 
 119. See 79 C.J.S Searches § 266 (2006) (“Nighttime execution must be the exception 
and not the rule.” (citing State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d 450 (S.D. 1985))); see also State v. 
Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) (“Historically, there has been a strong aversion to 
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greater invasion of privacy than do daytime searches.120 However, 
courts vary in their interpretation of the correct remedy if police 
effect an unauthorized nighttime search. This Part explores the 
history and development of law relating to nighttime searches. The 
first Section discusses the early history of the nighttime search rule. 
The second Section discusses recent jurisprudence regarding 
nighttime searches, including the Supreme Court decision in 
Gooding v. United States.121 
A. Nighttime Searches in Early American History 
Even prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, “there 
was a strong aversion to nighttime searches” in early American 
common law.122 It appears that it was an early common law principle 
to limit search warrants to the daytime.123 The general warrants 
issued in England forbade nighttime searches,124 and “[e]ven the 
Writs of Assistance, more odious and abusive than the general 
 
nighttime searches.”); State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 545 (Or. 1982) (“The most obvious and 
fundamental policy of the statute [requiring daytime searches unless the issuing judge 
specifically authorizes a nighttime search] is a legislative determination that execution of search 
warrants during the day is to be normal and that nighttime searches are to be exceptional.”). 
The definition of “nighttime” depends upon the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3917 (2006) (between 10:00 p.m. and 6:30 a.m.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,  
§ 2308 (2006) (between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.); MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006) (between 
8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.). 
 120. See, e.g., 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 24:7 (2006) [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE] (“Most jurisdictions recognize that nighttime entry involves a significantly greater 
invasion of privacy than its daytime counterpart.”); see also Lindner, 592 P.2d at 857 (“[E]ntry 
into an occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than 
entry executed during the daytime.”); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Minn. 1978) 
(“[A] nighttime search of a home involves a much greater intrusion upon privacy and is 
presumably more alarming than an ordinary daytime search of a home.” (citing State v. 
Stephenson, 245 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1976))); State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410 
(N.D. 1979) (“Courts have long recognized that nighttime searches constitute greater 
intrusions on privacy than do daytime searches.”). 
 121. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974). 
 122. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968); see also 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7 (“[A]t common law, prior to the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches.”). 
 123. 79 C.J.S Searches § 265 (2006). 
 124. O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing 2 
HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113 (Stokes & Ingersoll eds. 1847)). For a discussion of general 
warrants, see supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
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warrants, permitted searches of dwellings only in the daytime.”125 
Early American revulsion of nighttime searches of private homes is 
evidenced by the first Congress passing two laws forbidding the 
practice.126 The sentiment shared by early Americans was that the 
“[n]ight-time search was the evil in its most obnoxious form.”127 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Gooding v. United States 
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
the issue of whether or not nighttime search violations implicate the 
Fourth Amendment—as it did with knock-and-announce violations 
in Wilson v. Arkansas and its progeny128—thus, there is no Supreme 
Court guidance on whether or not the exclusionary rule should be 
applied to nighttime search violations. The closest the Court has 
come to addressing the issue was in the case of Gooding v. United 
States.129 In Gooding, a criminal defendant argued that “evidence 
offered against him at his trial should have been suppressed because 
it was seized at nighttime in violation of governing statutory 
provisions.”130 The defendant did not, however, argue that the 
nighttime search violated the Fourth Amendment.131 Thus, the 
Court resolved the case on statutory grounds and did not specifically 
address the possible Fourth Amendment ramifications.132 
 
 125. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473; see also Boyance, 398 F.2d at 898 (“Even the odious 
‘writs of assistance’ which outraged colonial America permitted search of dwellings only in the 
daytime.”). For a discussion of writs of assistance, see supra notes 18–22 and accompanying 
text. 
 126. O’Rourke, 875 F.2d at 1473 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 and 
Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 29, 1 Stat. 206). 
 127. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961). 
 128. See supra Part III.B. 
 129. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); see also George E. Dix, Means of 
Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89, 101–02 
(1982) (“The closest the [United States Supreme] Court came to addressing the time of 
search issue was in Gooding v. United States, which involved the execution of a search 
warrant.”). 
 130. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 431; see also Dix, supra note 129, at 102 (“Gooding argued 
only that the issuance of the warrant did not comply with the applicable statutory provisions 
regarding nighttime warrants.”). 
 131. Dix, supra note 129, at 102. 
 132. See Gooding, 416 U.S. at 458; see also Paul Morris, Case Note, Fouse v. State: The 
Arkansas Nighttime Search Rule—Helping Make Arkansas the Country’s Number One Producer 
of Methamphetamine, 53 ARK. L. REV. 965, 972 (2000) (“[T]he Court disposed of the case on 
statutory grounds and never specifically addressed the constitutionality issue . . . .”). 
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Nevertheless, Justice Marshall took the opportunity in his 
dissenting opinion to discuss the constitutional considerations. 
Justice Marshall stated that, in his opinion, “there is no expectation 
of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional 
protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the 
privacy of our homes during the night.”133 
The idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the 
home in the middle of the night . . . rousing the residents out of 
their beds, and forcing them to stand by in indignity in their night 
clothes while the police rummage through their belongings does 
indeed smack of a “‘police state’ lacking in the respect for . . . the 
right of privacy dictated by the U.S. Constitution.”134 
Justice Marshall felt that a nighttime search was a “severe 
intrusion upon privacy”135 and therefore required “a greater 
justification.”136 Thus, it was Justice Marshall’s contention that the 
nighttime search required “some additional justification . . . over and 
above the ordinary showing of probable cause”137 because 
“increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to 
justify increasingly intrusive searches.”138 
Although the majority opinion in Gooding did not address the 
constitutional considerations relating to the Fourth Amendment,139 
the case “has been interpreted by other courts to say that the time of 
search does not enter into a Fourth Amendment analysis.”140 Several 
courts have held that nighttime searches have a “constitutional 
 
 133. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-538, at 12 (1969)). 
 135. Id. at 463 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the 
nighttime intrusion into a private home.” (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S 493, 498 
(1958))). 
 136. Id. at 464 (quoting Brief for United States at 14, Gooding, 416 U.S. 430 (No. 72-
6902)). 
 137. Id. at 462. 
 138. Id. at 464. 
 139. Dix, supra note 129, at 104 (“The opinion of the [Gooding] Court evinces no 
sensitivity to or acknowledgment of constitutional considerations.”); id. at 105 (“Gooding 
demonstrated an almost total lack of sensitivity to potential fourth amendment significance of 
the timing of a search.”). 
 140. Morris, supra note 132, at 973; see also CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120,  
§ 24:7 (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that the factor of a nighttime search is related 
to the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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dimension”141 and that the issue of a nighttime search is “sensitively 
related to the reasonableness issue” of the Fourth Amendment.142 
However, other courts have held that a nighttime search of a private 
residence raises only statutory—and not constitutional—
implications.143 Thus, while some courts have excluded evidence 
obtained during an unauthorized nighttime search,144 other courts 
have found various ways to avoid applying the exclusionary rule.145 
 
 141. See, e.g., State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. 1978), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (“Although the general rule 
against nighttime searches is statutory, it may also have a constitutional dimension.”). 
 142. States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979); see also United States ex 
rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968) (“The time of a police search of an 
occupied family home may be a significant factor in determining whether, in a Fourth 
Amendment sense, the search is ‘unreasonable.’”); State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 
1979) (“Searches of private dwellings executed during the nighttime take on additional 
constitutional significance.”); State v. Garcia, 45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. 2002) (“Many 
jurisdictions recognize that the decision to execute a search warrant at night may implicate 
constitutional rights.”). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he 
particular procedures mandated before a night search may be conducted are not part of the 
fourth amendment . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992) 
(“Many courts have specifically or by implication rejected the claim that the nighttime search 
limitation has any basis in either State or the Federal Constitutions.”). 
 144. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 540 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he lack 
of a showing by the state to justify the nighttime search forces us to say that the motion [to 
suppress evidence] should have been granted.”); State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96, 98 (N.M. 
1969) (“We conclude that a nighttime search is not authorized in the absence of appropriate 
direction contained in the warrant and consequently the searches involved here were illegal and 
unreasonable and the motion to suppress should have been granted.”); State v. Fields, 691 
N.W.2d 233, 238 (N.D. 2005) (“We conclude the search was unreasonable because probable 
cause for the nighttime warrant . . . did not exist. The evidence obtained as a result of the 
unwarranted nighttime search must be suppressed.”). 
Arkansas courts have seemed especially inclined to suppress evidence obtained in 
unauthorized nighttime searches. See, e.g., Fouse v. State, 989 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1999); 
Richardson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 572 (Ark. 1993); Garner v. State, 820 S.W.2d 446 (Ark. 
1991); State v. Martinez, 811 S.W.2d 319 (Ark. 1991); Hall v. State, 789 S.W.2d 456 (Ark. 
1990); State v. Broadway, 599 S.W.2d 721 (Ark. 1980); Dodson v. State, 199 S.W.3d 115 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2004); Ramey v. State, 863 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). For a criticism 
of Arkansas’s stance on nighttime searches, see generally Morris, supra note 132. 
 145. See, e.g., United States v. Maholy, 1 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 1993) (“We need not 
reach the question whether the nighttime authorization in the warrant was in fact reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment because we find that even if the nighttime search violated the 
Fourth Amendment, the fruits of the search were admissible under [the Leon good faith 
exception].”); United States v. Twenty-two Thousand, Two Hundred Seven Dollars 
($22,287.00), U.S. Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f this warrant was in 
fact served after 10 p.m., it was very shortly thereafter and because, in our view, under the 
circumstances presented here the exclusionary rule should not be applied even if it was served 
shortly after the termination of ‘daytime’ . . . .”); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1122 
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V. APPLYING HUDSON TO NIGHTTIME SEARCHES 
Because the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime search 
rule are very similar, the Court’s holding from Hudson v. Michigan 
should be extended to nighttime search violations. In other words, if 
the exclusionary rule is not the correct remedy for violations of the 
knock-and-announce rule, then it is not the correct remedy for 
violations of the nighttime search rule either. This Part compares the 
two rules to show why the holding of Hudson should be extended to 
violations of the nighttime search rule. The first Section compares 
the early history of the rules and shows that unannounced entries 
and nighttime searches were both disfavored by founding Americans. 
The second Section compares the current statutory framework of the 
two rules and shows the similarities between the operation of both 
rules under statutory authority. The third Section compares the 
purposes of the rules, focusing specifically on the protection of 
interests enumerated in the Hudson decision. The final Section 
summarizes the comparisons and concludes that based on the 
similarities between the common law history, statutory codification, 
and purposes of the two rules, the Hudson decision should also apply 
to violations of the nighttime search rule. 
A. Comparing the Early Histories 
There is a strong correlation between the early common law 
histories of the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime search 
rule. One similarity is that both rules were part of American common 
 
(6th Cir. 1978) (“In this case, the defendant’s interests have not been violated, though the 
procedures were not observed.”); Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 835 (“[W]e hold that the unjustified 
granting of permission for a nighttime execution of the warrant was a statutory violation which 
under the circumstances does not mandate exclusion of the evidence seized.”); State v. 
Goodwin, 686 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“We conclude that, while executing a 
warrant less than two minutes before the applicable time for commencement of the search 
warrant constitutes a statutory violation, the early execution is a de minimis violation and does 
not justify suppression of the fruits of the search as a remedy.”); Garcia, 45 P.3d at 906 
(holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and therefore suppression was not 
required, because “the nighttime search . . . was conducted upon people who were observed to 
be active in the nighttime”); State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (Or. 1982) (“It does not 
follow that evidence seized in execution of the search warrant must be suppressed. . . . The 
evidence could validly be seized in the daytime, and it could validly have been seized at night if 
the judge had found the kind of circumstances for authorizing a nighttime seizure . . . .”). 
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law even before the Fourth Amendment was ratified.146 This 
similarity is important because the Supreme Court has stated that in 
determining whether or not a search and seizure is reasonable, “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted.”147 
In fact, both rules applied to the general warrants and writs of 
assistance that prompted the colonists to adopt the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.148 Thus, even the most odious warrants in colonial times 
were executed with announcement and were only executed during 
the daytime. Additionally, both rules were adopted into early 
American law, either by courts adopting the common law149 or by 
statutes codifying the common law.150 Thus, by comparing the early 
histories of the two rules, it is clear that both were important 
common law rules that existed prior to the ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment and both were more formally adopted into law very 
early in America’s history. 
B. Comparing the Statutory Framework 
Several jurisdictions have enacted legislation related to the 
knock-and-announce rule151 and the nighttime search rule.152 Such 
 
 146. See CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7 (“[A]t common law, prior to the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches.”); Josephson, 
supra note 17, at 1237 (stating that the knock-and-announce rule “was embraced in the 
United States prior to the ratification of the Constitution”). 
 147. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
 148. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 52 (1963) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) 
(“[S]ervice of the general warrants and writs of assistance was usually preceded at least by some 
form of notice or demand for admission.”); O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 
1473 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the general warrants in England forbade nighttime 
searches and that “[e]ven the Writs of Assistance, more odious and abusive than the general 
warrants, permitted searches of dwellings only in the daytime”). 
 149. Garcia, supra note 56, at 689 (“Early American case law adopted the view that 
forcible entry into a home was lawful only after notice.”). 
 150. See United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968) 
(“During the early years of the republic this common-law tradition [of prohibiting nighttime 
searches] was embodied in two statutes passed by our first Congress that authorized only 
daytime searches.” (citations omitted)). 
 151. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-9 (LexisNexis 1995) (“To execute a search warrant, an 
officer may break open any door or window of a house, any part of a house or anything therein 
if after notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance.”); CAL. PENAL CODE  
§ 1531 (West 2000) (“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a 
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his 
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statutes are often quite similar in that they require the executing 
officers to follow the knock-and-announce rule and the nighttime 
search rule, unless the issuing judge finds reasonable cause to “break 
the rules.” To demonstrate these similarities, this Section compares 
the Utah statutes that codify the knock-and-announce rule and the 
nighttime search rule. 
Section 77-23-210 of the Utah Code includes the 
announcement requirement.153 This Section states that police cannot 
use force to enter premises when executing a search warrant unless 
“after notice of [the officer’s] authority and purpose, there is no 
response or he is not admitted with reasonable promptness.”154 
However, an issuing magistrate can issue a “no-knock warrant” if the 
magistrate finds that “the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result 
to any person if notice were given.”155 Thus, under Utah law, an 
officer must follow the knock-and-announce rule unless the issuing 
judge finds that there is reasonable cause for the officer to execute 
the warrant without knocking and announcing. 
Section 77-23-205 of the Utah Code includes the nighttime 
search rule.156 This Section states that “[t]he magistrate shall insert a 
direction in the warrant that it be served in the daytime.”157 
However, the issuing magistrate can issue a nighttime search warrant 
if “the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to believe 
 
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.09 (West 2001) 
(“The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of 
a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer’s authority 
and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein.”). 
 152. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3917 (2001) (“Upon a showing of good 
cause therefor, the magistrate may, in his discretion insert a direction in the warrant that it may 
be served at any time of the day or night. In the absence of such a direction, the warrant may 
be served only in the daytime.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1533 (“Upon a showing of good cause, 
the magistrate may, in his or her discretion, insert a direction in a search warrant that it may be 
served at any time of the day or night. In the absence of such a direction, the warrant shall be 
served only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.”); FLA. STAT. § 933.10 (“A search 
warrant issued under this chapter may, if expressly authorized in such warrant by the judge, be 
executed by being served either in the daytime or in the nighttime, as the exigencies of the 
occasion may demand or require.”). 
 153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). 
 154. Id. § 77-23-210(1). 
 155. Id. § 77-23-210(2). 
 156. Id. § 77-23-205. 
 157. Id. § 77-23-205(1). “Daytime” under Utah law is defined as “the hours beginning 
at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m.” Id. § 77-23-201(1). 
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a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good 
reason.”158 Therefore, under Utah law, a search warrant must be 
issued during the daytime unless the issuing judge finds that there is 
reasonable cause for the warrant to be executed at night. 
The similarities between the statutory codifications of the knock-
and-announce rule and the nighttime search rule are thus readily 
apparent. Both statutes require executing officers to obey the 
respective rule contained in the statute, unless the issuing magistrate 
finds reasonable proof that evidence would be destroyed or the 
officers’ safety would be jeopardized. In these situations, both 
statutes allow the magistrate to include an exception in the warrant, 
thereby allowing the officers to either enter the residence without 
announcement or serve the warrant at night.159 
C. Comparing the Purposes 
In Hudson, the Court discussed three purposes of the knock-
and-announce rule in an effort to show that applying the 
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to protecting these interests.160 
Two of these purposes—protection from violence and protection of 
privacy and dignity—have also been cited extensively by courts as 
purposes of the nighttime search rule. The third purpose cited by 
Hudson—protection of property—has not been cited by courts as a 
purpose of the nighttime search rule; however, the protection of 
property can be legitimately viewed as a purpose of the nighttime 
search rule. This Section discusses the three protections afforded by 
the knock-and-announce rule, as pronounced in Hudson, and 
compares courts’ statements regarding these protections in both the 
knock-and-announce and nighttime search contexts. 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. As previously mentioned, these statutory similarities are not unique to Utah. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3915, 13-3916 (2001) (requiring executing officers to 
announce their authority and purpose before entering, unless the magistrate has “authorized 
an unannounced entry”); id. § 13-3917 (requiring executing officers to serve search warrants 
during the daytime, unless the magistrate has included a nighttime search direction in the 
warrant); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (2006) (allowing executing officers to enter 
unannounced if the issuing magistrate inserts a direction into the warrant allowing 
unannounced entry); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(E) (requiring executing officers to serve the 
search warrant during the daytime, unless the magistrate finds reasonable cause for the warrant 
to be executed at night). 
 160. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006). 
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1. Protection from violence 
One interest protected by the knock-and-announce rule, 
according to the Hudson Court, is “the protection of human life and 
limb.”161 The Court noted that the knock-and-announce rule helps 
to prevent violence because “an unannounced entry may provoke 
violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.”162 The 
Court had previously mentioned this purpose in Sabbath v. United 
States when it noted that one facet of the rule is “to safeguard 
officers, who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced intrusion 
into a home, for someone with no right to be there.”163 
Other courts have also held that the prevention of violence is one 
of the primary reasons behind the knock-and-announce rule.164 An 
unannounced entry is “conducive to violent confrontations between 
the occupant and individuals who enter his home without proper 
notice.”165 Announcement offers safety to both the residents of the 
home as well as to the police executing the warrant.166 The rule 
protects the residents of the home from unnecessary violence by 
police and “reduces the risk [of injury] to innocent persons who may 
be in the house at the time of the search.”167 It also protects police 
from the violence of a resident reacting in self-defense.168 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968). 
 164. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas, 47 P.3d 127, 133 (Wash. 2002) (stating that one 
purpose of the rule is “to reduce potential violence, which might arise from an unannounced 
entry”). 
 165. Duke v. Superior Court, 461 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1969). 
 166. Commonwealth v. Crompton, 682 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1996) (“The purpose of the 
knock and announce rule is to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and 
occupants . . . .”); State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he rule 
provides a form of protection from violence and assures the safety and security of both the 
occupants of the dwelling and the officers executing the search warrant.”). 
 167. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1234. 
 168. See Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001) (stating that one reason 
why police are required to knock and announce is to “decrease the potential for a violent 
response when a search is executed”); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1985) 
(“[A]n unannounced entry by officers increases the potential for violence by provoking 
defensive measures a surprised occupant would otherwise not have taken had he known that 
the officers possessed a warrant to search his home.”); see also Josephson, supra note 17, at 
1234 (“Unannounced entries put the officers involved at risk of being shot by frightened 
homeowners.”). 
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The protection from violence has also historically been cited as a 
purpose of the prohibition against nighttime searches.169 “The rule 
against unauthorized nighttime searches is . . . designed to protect 
against the tumult and turmoil that attends entry of residences in the 
dead of night.”170 The Oregon Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he 
invasion of private premises in the small hours of the night smacks of 
totalitarian methods and is more likely to create the terror that 
precipitates gun battles.”171 Several courts have noted that a 
nighttime invasion increases the likelihood of violence because an 
invasion of the home is more alarming at night than during the 
day.172 Nighttime searches cause “abrupt intrusions on sleeping 
residents in the dark,”173 thereby increasing the likelihood of a 
violent reaction from those inside the home.174 
As with the knock-and-announce rule, the nighttime search rule 
protects both residents and police.175 It protects residents because 
“[f]ree from the scrutiny of potential witnesses and provided with 
the cover of darkness, police officers may be tempted to use 
unnecessary violence against the subject.”176 It also protects police 
because “[p]erceiving that it is more difficult to protect oneself from 
 
 169. Even in pre-colonial England, the purpose of preventing violence was cited as a 
reason for the prohibition of nighttime searches. See COOLEY, supra note 17, at 430 (“It is fit 
that such warrants to search do express that search be made in the daytime; and though I do 
not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they are very inconvenient without it; for 
many times, under pretence of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been 
committed, and at best it creates a great disturbance.” (quoting Lord Hale in his treatise Pleas 
of the Crown)). 
 170. CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 120, § 24:7. 
 171. State v. Brock, 653 P.2d 543, 545 (Or. 1982); see also id. (“[T]he purpose of the 
statute is to avoid the possibility of terror and gunplay which may arise from forcible nighttime 
entries . . . .”). 
 172. See United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972) (“A knock at 
the door is more alarming in the middle of the night, and it is no less so because the officer 
knocking has a search warrant.”); Brock, 653 P.2d at 547 (stating that the rule “is concerned 
with minimizing the heightened risks and apprehensions associated with a nighttime intrusion 
into the home”). 
 173. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1104 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 174. See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrant at 
Nighttime, 41 A.L.R.5th 171, 233 (1996) (“Persons awakened from sleep may be confused 
and overreact to an intrusion at night for this reason.”). 
 175. Id. (“[N]ighttime searches pose a greater danger to both the subject of the search 
and law enforcement officials.”); see also Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 
(Mass. 1992) (stating that nighttime search warrants are disfavored because “nighttime police 
intrusion . . . endanger[s] the police and slumbering citizens”). 
 176. Catalano, supra note 174, at 233. 
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harm at night, or suffering from a more diffused fear of the dark, the 
subject of the search may experience an increased level of discomfort 
or apprehension and overreact to nighttime entry.”177 
2. Protection of privacy and dignity 
Another interest protected by the knock-and-announce rule, as 
enumerated by the Hudson Court, is the protection of “those 
elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden 
entrance.”178 In Miller v. United States, the Court noted that the 
knock-and-announce rule embodies “the reverence of the law for the 
individual’s right of privacy in his house.”179 Although the residents 
of the home do not have the right to refuse entrance to police 
officers armed with a valid warrant, “the occupants of a house to be 
searched have a privacy interest in activities not subject to the 
warrant.”180 “Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or 
embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion.”181 
Other federal and state courts have also listed the protection of 
privacy as one of the primary purposes of the knock-and-announce 
rule.182 The Fifth Circuit has stated that the knock-and-announce 
rule “protect[s] people from unnecessary intrusion into their private 
activities.”183 The Seventh Circuit noted that “[o]ne purpose of the 
rule is to protect the privacy of the occupants and to give them an 
opportunity to prepare for the agents’ entry.”184 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court stated that “the purpose of the knock-and-announce 
rule is to . . . protect against unnecessary shock and 
embarrassment.”185 Legal commentators have also recognized the 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006). 
 179. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). 
 180. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1235. 
 181. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 182. See, e.g., State v. Sumpter, 563 S.E.2d 60, 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a 
purpose of the knock-and-announce requirement is “to protect people from unnecessary 
intrusion into their private activities” (quoting State v. Harris, 551 S.E.2d 499, 506 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2001))); State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he rule 
protects the privacy of the occupant living in the dwelling.”); State v. Cardenas, 47 P.3d 127, 
133 (Wash. 2002) (stating that one purpose of the knock-and-announce requirement in 
Washington law is “to protect an occupant’s right to privacy”). 
 183. United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 184. Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 185. Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 2001). 
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privacy purpose of the knock-and-announce rule, as evidenced by the 
statement of one commentator that the rule “guards individual 
dignity” by giving the occupant of the home “a brief period of time 
to compose oneself and prepare for an intrusion into the home.”186 
The protection of privacy and dignity has also often been cited as 
an interest protected by the nighttime search rule.187 It is widely 
recognized by both courts and legal commentators that nighttime 
searches inflict a greater invasion of privacy than do daytime 
searches.188 The Second Circuit has noted that nighttime searches are 
discouraged because of the “peculiar abrasiveness of official 
intrusions at such periods.”189 A nighttime search is even more likely 
to result in a violation of privacy and dignity than a daytime search 
because “[a] search at night is more likely than a daytime search to 
interrupt the activities of a personal nature more commonly 
scheduled at that time.”190 This increased risk of violation of privacy 
and dignity at night can also be inferred from the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Richards v. Wisconsin that “[t]he brief interlude 
between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the 
opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of 
bed.”191 
 
 186. E. Martin Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle: The “Knock and 
Announce Rule” and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 86 (2005) 
(citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.5 (1997)). 
 187. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“[I]t is difficult to 
imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private 
home . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992) (“The 
underlying rationale [of the prohibition of nighttime searches] was that nighttime police 
intrusion posed a great threat to privacy [and] violated the sanctity of home . . . .”); State v. 
Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410 (N.D. 1979) (“The purpose of [North Dakota’s nighttime 
search statute] is to protect citizens from being subjected to the trauma of unwarranted 
nighttime searches.”). 
 188. See, e.g., State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (“[E]ntry into a 
residence in the middle of the night is a greater invasion of residential privacy than entry 
during the daytime.” (quoting State v. Winchell, 363 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. 1985))); see 
also supra note 120. 
 189. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 190. Catalano, supra note 174, at 233. 
 191. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997) (discussing the reasons for the 
knock-and-announce rule). 
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3. Protection of property 
The Hudson Court stated that a third interest protected by the 
knock-and-announce rule was the “protection of property.”192 The 
Court noted that the rule protected the property of the homeowner 
because if police announce their identity and purpose, the 
homeowner is given the opportunity to open the door and allow the 
police to enter rather than the police breaking down the door or 
otherwise damaging the home.193 The Court had previously 
recognized this purpose in Richards v. Wisconsin, in which the Court 
noted that an individual should “be provided the opportunity to 
comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property 
occasioned by a forcible entry.”194 Additionally, in Wilson v. 
Arkansas, the Court stated that the knock-and-announce rule was 
“justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would 
avoid ‘the destruction or breaking of any house . . . by which great 
damage and inconvenience might ensue . . . .’”195 
Other courts, as well as legal commentators, have also noted the 
purpose of protecting property.196 For example, the New York Court 
of Appeals noted that announcement “serves the purpose of 
providing the person with an opportunity to respond to the demand 
for admittance, thus obviating the need for forcible entry.”197 Thus, 
“the rule prevents needless destruction of property.”198 “[R]equiring 
police to knock-and-announce before forcibly entering a residence 
protects the homeowner’s property interests. A person should be 
given the opportunity to voluntarily submit to a search before having 
his property damaged.”199 
 
 192. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5. 
 195. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 935–36 (1995) (quoting Semayne’s Case, 
(1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (K.B.)). 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Sagaribay, 982 F.2d 906, 909 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
the announcement rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 serves the purpose of “preventing unnecessary 
destruction of private property”); State v. Harada, 41 P.3d 174, 184 (Haw. 2002) (stating that 
one purpose of the rule is “to prevent unnecessary property damage”); Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 534 A.2d 1054, 1056 (Pa. 1987) (“The purpose of this ‘knock and announce’ rule 
is . . . to prevent property damage resulting from forced entry.”). 
 197. People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 231 (N.Y. 1978). 
 198. State v. Perry, 178 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005). 
 199. Josephson, supra note 17, at 1235 (footnote omitted). 
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No courts have mentioned the protection of property as a 
purpose of the nighttime search rule. Nevertheless, protection of 
property can be viewed as a valid purpose of the prohibition of 
nighttime searches. Case law and statutes allow executing officers to 
break open windows or doors to effect a search warrant if they are 
not admitted after a “reasonable time.”200 When police knock on the 
door of a home during the daytime, there is a good chance that 
someone in the home will be awake and can respond to the knock 
within a reasonable time, thereby obviating the need for the police to 
break down the door. At night, however, it is less likely that police 
will get a timely response from the residents, even if those same 
persons would have answered without delay during the daytime. The 
reason for the delay is obvious: people who are awakened from their 
sleep at night respond slower than people who are already awake 
during the daytime. It may be argued that the reasonableness 
standard requires police to wait longer at night than during the 
daytime. Nevertheless, courts have found very short periods of 
time—even as short as five seconds—to be reasonable wait times 
before forceful entry is made in searches conducted during late night 
and early morning hours that could be “nighttime hours” based on 
the jurisdiction.201 
 
 200. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.6 (West 2003) (requiring executing officers to 
announce their authority and purpose, but permitting the officers to break into a structure if 
their “admittance has not been immediately authorized”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 207(B), (C) 
(requiring an executing officer to wait for “a reasonable period of time” before forcibly 
entering the premises); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33, 38–39 (2003) (holding that 
police officers acted properly when they broke open the door of an apartment with a battering 
ram only fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking and announcing, regardless of the fact that 
the resident was in the shower at the time and did not hear the knock); United States v. 
Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 372–74 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that police officers, who were 
attempting to execute a search warrant at 6:00 a.m., had acted properly when they smashed 
through the front door with a battering ram approximately one minute after knocking and 
announcing). For a general discussion on the requirement that officers wait a “reasonable 
time” before entering with force, see 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures §§ 243–44 (2000 
& Supp. 2006). 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 98-3183, 2000 WL 712385, at *4 (6th Cir. 
May 24, 2000) (holding that a five-second wait before forcibly entering an apartment, during a 
search warrant execution at 7:00 a.m., was reasonable); United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 
1030–31 (10th Cir. 1993), cited in Randall v. State, 793 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that police officers waited a reasonable time when they broke down a door 
with a battering ram after waiting only ten to twelve seconds when attempting to execute a 
search warrant late at night). But see Randall, 793 So. 2d at 60 (holding that a ten-second wait 
during a warrant execution between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. did not satisfy the knock-and-
announce requirement). 
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D. Summary of Comparisons 
The comparisons of the two rules contained in the previous 
Sections underscore the argument that the rationale of Hudson 
should be extended to nighttime search violations. In Hudson and 
the knock-and-announce cases that preceded it, the Supreme Court 
looked to the early common law history, the statutory requirements, 
and the purposes of the knock-and-announce rule in order to 
determine if an unannounced search violated the Fourth 
Amendment and, as a consequence, whether or not the evidence 
should be excluded from subsequent criminal trials. Because the 
nighttime search rule shares these same characteristics with the 
knock-and-announce rule, the rationale of Hudson should be 
extended to violations of the nighttime search rule. Thus, because of 
the similarities between the two rules, the exclusionary rule should 
not be used as a remedy for violations of either rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the exclusionary rule has been in existence in United 
States jurisprudence for almost one hundred years, courts are still 
struggling to decide when suppression of evidence is the correct 
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. The Supreme Court 
added some clarification when it held in Hudson v. Michigan that the 
exclusionary rule is inapplicable when police violate the knock-and-
announce rule. However, the propriety of using the exclusionary rule 
in other contexts remains unclear, including the question of whether 
or not suppression of evidence is the correct remedy for violations of 
the nighttime search rule. Because the common law history, the 
statutory codification, and the purposes of the two rules are virtually 
identical, the Hudson holding should be extended to nighttime 
search violations. Thus, evidence obtained by police during an 
unauthorized nighttime search should not be suppressed in criminal 
trials based on Fourth Amendment challenges to admissibility. 
Jeffry R. Gittins 
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